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Even in these times people still want to 
listen to leaders in a village before they go 
and fight. People still try to conform to the 
traditional pattern. But today the notable dif-
ference from the past is this: the few young 
men who possess guns make the decision 
whether to go and fight or not. Money, pigs, 
and the views of leaders are not required. We 
are all like passengers in a public bus and the 
driver is in control. If I happen to have a gun, 
then my people must listen to what I have to 
say. I am the driver. The power is in the gun. 
It is the gun that is speaking and not me. 
(Anonymous interview, Wakumale, Enga 2005) 
In 2005, the Lai Valley of Enga was dev-
astated with houses burned to ash, trees 
chopped to ragged stumps, modern facilities 
destroyed as young men drove “the war bus”. 
The devastation of valleys of Enga in modern 
times appeared unprecedented, but when 
one looks back into Enga historical traditions 
from around 1800–1850, long before the 
coming of white men and the gun, there was 
a period of equal destruction. Fluctuations in 
the intensity of warfare and the prevalence 
of peace over generations characterize Enga 
history. As the Enga say, “Our land is green 
and black, green during times of peace and 
black when war rages” (Young 2004). This 
runs contrary to stereotypic views that “tribes” 
in traditional societies are caught in a never-
ending spiral of revenge and that primitive 
war is total war with limited means (Keeley 
1996). Cycles of war give us an opportunity 
to explore the actors, dynamics, and contexts 
that generate chaos, as well as those that 
restore order.
Here I will consider cycles of Enga war-
fare within the 350-year span for which we 
have information on warfare from oral and 
written historical records. The first is a period 
of intensive warfare that occurred in the first 
half of the 19th century, redrawing the map 
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of Enga after the introduction of the sweet 
potato. These turbulent times were followed 
by a hundred-year period of successful ini-
tiatives to keep warfare in check and to pro-
mote prosperity. The Colonial Era then inter-
vened with a ban on warfare. The second 
is a period of devastating “modern” warfare 
that began a few years before Independence 
in 1975 (Gordon and Kipilan 1982); Paney 
1973) and accelerated in 1990 with the adop-
tion of new technology in warfare, home-
made shotguns and high-powered weapons, 
reversing the power hierarchy between older 
men and youths. Fieldwork and village court 
records allow us to trace the rise in violence, 
the formation of warring gangs of mercenar-
ies, the impact on the population of Enga 
and the state of Papua New Guinea, and in 
the last few years, what may be a trend back 
towards moderation.
While reasons for any given war are 
contextual, longer term cycles in the intensity 
of war have much to do with intergenerational 
dynamics. For analysis I will borrow an 
approach from behavioral ecology: parent–
offspring conflict theory (Trivers 1974). 
Parent–offspring conflict theory proposes 
that certain activities have different payoffs 
for parents and children. When applied to 
warfare, parent–offspring theory proposes 
that the “sons” generation will use warfare 
to pursue their individual interests in forming 
male alliances, gaining status, and increasing 
access to resources to attract women. The 
“fathers” generation will seek to contain 
warfare and use it strategically to create 
an environment conducive to the welfare 
of a broader population including their 
descendants and those of close relatives. 
Elders will strive to foster beneficial social 
and political relationships for themselves and 
for their group.
Parent–offspring conflict theory dovetails 
with other approaches from the social scienc-
es. For example, Daly and Wilson’s (1985) 
“young male syndrome” proposes that coali-
tional violence is perpetuated by young men 
who stand to gain and have little to lose. The 
“youth bulge” or demographic armament the-
ory (Fuller 1995; Heinsohn 2003) attributes 
increases in frequency and destructiveness 
of warfare to periods of demographic growth 
when “sons” can find no prestigious positions 
(Mesquida and Wiener 1999). 
After a period of economic change, rapid 
population growth, and an increase in the 
proportion of young men to elders, it would 
be expected that coalitional violence would 
increase as youth and elders respond to 
new costs and benefits, including those 
introduced by the nation state. In some 
societies a cycle of runaway warfare results 
causing population decline as it has among 
the Waorani of Ecuador (Beckerman et al. 
2009) or the Etoro of Papua New Guinea 
(Kelly 1977; 2000). However, in most cases, 
if a population is to flourish, it cannot be 
constantly at war. Elders understand this 
and work to realign the goals of youth with 
their own. Waves of war and peace will thus 
depend to some extent on which genera-
tion is driving the “war bus” and whether the 
driver can navigate the obstacles of modern 
life: beer, marijuana, mobility, and the per-
spective that “money is life”. 
BacKground
The Enga: Past and present
The Enga of Papua New Guinea are a 
Highland horticultural society well described 
in the anthropological literature (Brennan 
1982; Feil 1984; Kyakas and Wiessner 1992; 
Lacey 1975, 1979; Meggitt 1965, 1972, 
1977; Talyaga (1982); Waddell (1972); and 
Wohlt (1978), amongst many others). Today 
they number some 300,000 and make up 
the largest linguistic group in Papua New 
Guinea. Their staple crop is the sweet potato 
used to feed large human and pig popula-
tions. The Enga are divided into nine mutu-
ally intelligible dialect groups (Brennan 1982) 
that share a common language as well as 
important economic, social, political, and 
religious orientations. First contact with Aus-
tralian patrols and gold prospectors occurred 
in the 1930s; the Colonial Administration was 
not established until after World War II.
The Enga are divided into tribes with 
1,500 to 8,000 members, each having con-
stituent exogamous patrilineal clans and 
sub-clans (Meggitt 1965). Clans of 350–
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1,000 are the units for most political actions, 
including war. Women devote themselves 
primarily to child-rearing, gardening, pig 
husbandry and more recently, cash crops. 
They maintain the private inter-group ties 
that are used to obtain wealth on credit from 
outside the clan to fuel their ceremonial dis-
tributions of wealth. Although men shoulder 
the heavy work of building houses, fencing 
and clearing forest, it is the politics of ritual, 
warfare, and ceremonial exchange of wealth 
that absorb much of their time and interest. 
Today men also devote time to cash enter-
prises and local, provincial and national 
politics. Both men and women participate in 
the activities of the many denominations of 
churches of Enga.
Traditionally Enga society was, and to 
some extent still is, governed by a “big-
man” system. All men started as equals and 
strove to make a name through producing 
pigs, excelling in mediation, organizing cer-
emonial exchange, negotiating peace and 
assisting their followers. Potential equality 
within the sexes was of utmost importance 
for internal cooperation; for external coop-
eration big-men strove to maintain equal-
ity of their clan vis-à-vis others (Wiess-
ner 2009). Ceremonial exchange networks 
crossed many clan boundaries and warfare 
was endemic as local groups jockeyed to 
maintain the matrix of equality necessary 
for long distance exchange to flow. Men 
formed coalitions of supporters to rise in 
status, but if they failed to deliver benefits 
to their followers, their demise was rapid. 
Today a new rung of modern leaders has 
been added: politicians, public servants and 
businessmen. All modern leaders participate 
in traditional clan activities and contribute 
generously to wealth distributions.
Pre-colonial history
The social, economic and political situation in 
Enga at the time of first contact with Europe-
ans in the 1930s was not a long-established 
one (Wiessner and Tumu 1998). Some 300 
years earlier, the sweet potato had been 
introduced to the island of New Guinea 
from Indonesia via local routes, releasing 
constraints on production (Watson 1965; 
Ballard et al. 2005). Historical traditions from 
all areas report subsistence and residential 
shifts, surplus pig production, population 
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Map 1. the tee cycle, the great ceremonial Wars and Kepele cult networks.
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growth (ca.1.1% per annum), and the expan-
sion of exchange and ritual in response to 
mounting social and political complexities 
(Wiessner and Tumu 1999; Wiessner and 
Tumu 1998; Wiessner 2002). 
During this time, three large exchange 
networks arose (Map 1): the Kepele cult 
network, the Great Ceremonial Wars, and 
the Tee Cycle. The Kepele cult network of 
western Enga drew together the tribes of the 
region for feasting, initiating boys, and com-
municating with the ancestors. The Great 
Ceremonial Wars of central Enga pulled 
allied tribes from four valley systems into 
staged tournament wars fought recurrently to 
demonstrate strength and brew exchanges 
of enormous proportions. The Tee Ceremo-
nial Exchange Cycle of eastern Enga was a 
three-phase cycle of exchange festivals that 
tied together clans of eastern and central 
Enga along major trade routes. 
Around the fourth to fifth generation 
before present, the Great Ceremonial Wars 
expanded under the forces of dramatic inter-
group competition. Leaders tapped into the 
wealth of the Tee Cycle to finance their wars 
and to reinvest the great quantities of wealth 
flowing from the Great War exchanges. In the 
1930s the Great Ceremonial Wars and Tee 
Cycle merged into a three phase exchange 
cycle that involved more than 350 clans 
and 40,000 people (Map 1) (Wiessner and 
Tumu 1998; Wiessner 2002). At the heart 
of the Tee Cycle was the quest to assemble 
as much wealth as possible in one place at 
one time and distribute it in public, bringing 
fame to both prominent individuals and their 
respective clans. 
The data
Different data sets will be used for the three 
periods of Enga history: the pre-colonial, the 
colonial and the post-independence periods. 
Enga oral historical traditions, atome pii, 
were collected from the 110 “tribes” of Enga 
between 1985 and 2005 (Wiessner and 
Tumu 1998). They are said to have origi-
nated in eyewitness accounts and contain 
information on many aspects of Enga life in 
the past, including settlement patterns, wars, 
migrations, songs, poetry and developments 
in agriculture, ritual and exchange (Lacey 
1975, 1979; Wiessner and Tumu 1998). They 
cover a period of some 350 years; accompa-
nying genealogies allow events to be placed 
in a chronological framework. Historical tra-
ditions yielded passing mention of over 200 
wars and 84 more detailed accounts of Enga 
wars of the past. Enga do not revise his-
torical traditions to fit current needs. Rather, 
they turn to a convenient chapter in their his-
tory to justify current actions. 
Data for the colonial period comes from 
the work of ethnographers, notably Mervyn 
Meggitt (1977), Gordon and Meggitt (1985), 
Gordon and Kipilan 1982, Roderic Lacey 
(1975, 1979) and William Wormsley and 
Michael Toke (1985). Data on “modern war-
fare” was collected with the assistance of 
village court magistrates between 1990 and 
2010 (Wiesner et al. 2007). This data set 
includes over 300 interviews with warriors, 
mercenaries, traditional leaders, village court 
magistrates, church leaders, women, and 
children. Village court records and inter-
views yield information on the clans involved, 
causes of conflict, deaths and outcomes for 
573 wars fought during this period. 
Enga warfare
No Enga historical traditions claim there was 
a “time before warfare”. The vast major-
ity of Enga wars were, and are still, fought 
between neighboring clans over conflicts 
that begin with a brawl and escalate. Many 
wars have deep historical roots and most are 
the result of culminating tensions. People 
who socialize and celebrate together on one 
day can turn into enemies overnight, dehu-
manize members of the offending clan, and 
be at war the next day. The Enga deplore 
war and do not recount historical traditions 
glorifying war heroes, nor did they develop 
more sophisticated weaponry over the 350-
year period, perhaps because the intent of 
most wars was to re-establish balance so 
that exchange could flow (Wiessner and 
Tumu 1998).
When war breaks out, women gather their 
possessions, pigs and children and flee to 
take refuge in clans of relatives. Allies come 
to join the fighters on the understanding that 
they will be compensated for allied deaths. 
In the past, wars began by day as lines of 
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fighters exchanged volleys of arrows in open 
areas in a somewhat sportive atmosphere. 
When a man was killed, anger flared and 
more deadly battle tactics were deployed 
such as ambushes and night raids. War 
magic was and still is practiced throughout 
Enga. Most pre-colonial wars ended after 
one to four deaths and within two to four-
teen days. Some wars raged into runaway 
aggression and resulted in more casualties 
(Meggitt 1977; Wiessner and Tumu 1998). 
Today with the introduction of modern weap-
ons, the characteristics of war have been 
radically altered (Wiessner 2006; Wiessner 
et al 2007).
Costs and benefits of wars differed for 
different age groups and continue to do 
so today. Some men went to war over the 
triggering incident, others to fight out old 
grudges. Youth fought for excitement, cama-
raderie and a chance to show off, while older 
men hoped to gain reputation and exchange 
partners through compensation payments. 
Warfare provided a way for young men to 
call attention to themselves, their prowess, 
and their willingness to sacrifice for the 
group. However, if they were to move on to 
become big-men, they had to go on to gain 
influence through ceremonial exchange.
At the clan level, warfare split clans 
who had grown too large to cooperate into 
independent units which then renewed ties. 
Though some wars were fought over land 
and others to keep control of trade routes, 
most were fought to restore reputation and 
inter-clan balance of power. This was essen-
tial because clans received a good part of 
the wealth for ceremonial exchange on loan 
from their neighbors; a reputation for being 
able to defend clan members and assets 
attracted more wealth. Enga wars were 
rarely fought with the intent of taking land.1 
When land was taken during war, it was usu-
ally no more than a few acres (Meggitt 1977) 
to humiliate the losers (Wiessner 2006) and 
if families were dispossessed, they could get 
land from fellow clansmen if necessary or 
move to their wives’ clans permanently. Land 
lost in war was often regained in subsequent 
wars. In the past, the cost of destruction of 
property in war was relatively low, but loss 
of human life was considerable; between 
15–25% of men died in warfare (Meggitt 
1977; Wiessner and Kelai, in preparation). 
Many of these were young unmarried men; 
their deaths made more women available for 
polygynous marriages of big-men. Warfare 
cut off the flow of wealth from other clans 
and both allied and enemy deaths had to 
be compensated, giving strong incentives 
to limit the length of wars. Severed ties and 
compensation for deaths incurred greater 
costs for elders than for youths.
PrE-colonial WarfarE
Around the time of the arrival of the sweet 
potato some eight to twelve generations 
ago, Enga traditions describe agriculture as 
precarious, the population as sparse, life as 
lonely, spouses hard to find, trade networks 
vast, and group loyalties strong (Wiessner 
and Tumu 1998). We have estimated on 
the basis of genealogies and settlement 
locations that the population of Enga in the 
1600s was between 10,000–20,000. None-
theless, life was punctuated by conflicts over 
hunting rights, sharing of game meat, or 
insult or injury. Warfare served to break up 
groups that had become too large to cooper-
ate or to displace quarrelsome neighbors. 
Shortly after the arrival of the sweet pota-
to, there were many voluntary migrations to 
take advantage of the new crop. Immigrants 
were welcomed by kin in horticultural groups 
with whom they had marriage ties. Unfortu-
nately those who were so eagerly recruited 
by relatives did not provide the supportive 
neighbors their hosts had hoped for. Within 
one or two generations of their arrival, the 
immigrants were often at war with their 
hosts (Wiessner 2006). Many of these wars 
appear to have originated from exploits of 
young men.
The most vicious wars in Enga history 
were fought after this period of rapid popu-
lation growth, adoption of new subsistence 
strategies, and residential shifts. These wars 
greatly altered the social landscape of the 
broader region. Vast tracts of up to 160 sq km 
of good agricultural land were vacated, for 
example, the entire Ambum valley. Historical 
traditions describe years of battle, devasta-
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tion and slaughter of the defeated as they 
fled. Refugee groups retreated deep into 
outlying areas of Enga where they occupied 
empty land or displaced non-Enga groups 
and prospered (Map 2). Victors were hard-
pressed to fill the land gained and encour-
aged allies and kin to help them occupy it 
(Wiessner and Tumu 1998). 
Responses to the wars of the sixth to 
seventh generation
As noted, the names and deeds of war 
heroes are not recorded in Enga historical 
traditions, so we know little of the benefits of 
these wars for young men. Early historical 
traditions cite hunting as a means for young 
men to build reputation; as hunting declined 
in importance, prowess in warfare may have 
become the primary means for young men to 
gain status. Historical traditions do mention 
more general benefits of the large wars of 
the time: unification of clans into larger fight-
ing forces and bonds formed with allies dur-
ing compensation exchanges for allies killed. 
However, they also suggest that the net 
effects were more detrimental than benefi-
cial to the strategies of elders. Regrets were 
expressed over the departure of a former 
neighbor, trade ties were severed and it was 
hard to find supportive allies to fill the land.
The first response of elders to the chaos 
was the institution of Sangai bachelors’ cults, 
which placed young men firmly under their 
control for education and discipline, gave 
them a prescribed course to success, and 
aligned the goals of younger and older men. 
The Sangai involved five days of elabo-
rate ritual for the growth of body and mind 
(Wiessner and Tumu 1998). By day, the 
bachelors cared for their bodies and sacred 
cult objects that would transform them. In the 
evening, they recited long praise poems that 
presented renowned local leaders as role 
models in many arenas, except warfare. At 
night, the young men were given a political 
education; sleep was interrupted to interpret 
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Map 2. schematic representation of major migrations in Enga after the introduction 
of the sweet potato. from the earliest generations of historical traditions until 
approximately the fourth generation before present, we recorded 270 migrations of 
entire clans or large segments of clans.
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dreams in the context of clan position with 
respect to warfare and exchange. Elders and 
youth thus became partners in political strat-
egies. Political revelations from dreams were 
put into song and presented to the public 
during a formal emergence ceremony for the 
bachelors. Around the age of 25–30, young 
men completed their transformation into 
mature marriageable adults with potential for 
success equal to that of all other men. 
A second development to put order to 
chaos was the creation of the Great Ceremo-
nial Wars—formal tournament battles held 
in central Enga. The goal of the Great Wars 
was to reweave exchange networks between 
the victors in past wars and those who had 
been displaced to the outer reaches of Enga 
territory.
The Great Ceremonial wars were 
planned and planted like a garden for 
the exchange that would follow. They 
were arranged when goods and valu-
ables were plentiful and when there 
were so many pigs that women com-
plained about their workloads. Every-
body knew what they were in for, how 
reparations were paid for deaths, and 
what the results would be. They were 
designed to open up new areas, fur-
ther existing exchange relations, foster 
tribal unity, and provide a competitive, 
but structured environment in which 
young men could strive for leadership. 
These qualities of the Great Wars 
made them differ from conventional 
wars, which disrupted relationships of 
trade and exchange, causing havoc 
and sometimes irreparable damage. 
The distributions of wealth that took 
place after the Great Wars brought 
trade goods from outlying areas into 
the Wabag area on the trade paths 
initially established by the salt trade. 
(Ambone Mati, Itapuni Nemani clan, 
Kopena, Wabag, 1988)
These ritualized battles involved pairs of 
tribes and their allies. After opening ceremo-
nies, hundreds of warriors in full ceremo-
nial dress exchanged volleys of arrows while 
spectators from far and wide gathered to 
watch. Women danced and sang along the 
sidelines. Men fought by day and courted 
women by night. These “battles without 
anger” went on for weeks or months with 
pauses to refuel. Deaths were not avenged 
and no land was won or lost. When a formal 
end to battle was called after weeks or even 
months of fighting, massive exchanges took 
place over a two–three-year period in which 
thousands of pigs changed hands. Through 
these exchanges, displaced groups were 
able to put themselves back on the map of 
trade and exchange that linked four valley 
systems (Map 1). Everybody stood to gain in 
the Great Ceremonial Wars. Youths had an 
opportunity to meet potential marriage part-
ners and display their fighting skills in front 
of the hundreds of spectators. Individual 
exchange partnerships forged between the 
opponents, hosting group, and allies allowed 
elders to achieve their political designs.
In between the Great Wars, smaller 
conventional wars continued to be fought. 
Around 1850, when the turmoil of preceding 
generations had settled, formal peace pro-
cesses were instituted that involved paying 
compensation for enemy deaths. Peace-
making allowed groups to fight and restore 
relations so that both parties could stay put 
and resume relations after warfare. Dur-
ing compensation each family gave wealth 
to and received returns from the relatives 
of the deceased and other families of their 
choice in the enemy clan during a series of 
public ceremonial exchanges that unfolded 
over the next two to three years. Peace was 
restored through forging a multiplicity of ties 
while time healed animosities (Wiessner 
and Tumu 1998). Big-men coordinated the 
event and contributed more than others; 
young men were under strong pressure 
not to disrupt the plans of their clans as a 
whole. Pressures to pay compensation to 
the enemy were two-fold: (1) there was less 
empty land for dispersal and (2) victors did 
not want to expel neighboring “brother” clans 
who supplied them with wealth in enchained 
ceremonial exchange. 
Paying reparations to both enemies and 
allies provided a major incentive to end 
wars before too many deaths were incurred. 
Accordingly, rules were laid down to manage 
emotions and contain warfare. For example, 
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before going to war (Sackschewsky et al. 
1970) and during the course of wars, clans-
men met to discuss plans and restrictions:
•  Do not kill a person on the land of another 
clan.
•  Do not deface corpses.
•  Do not kill women and children.
•  Do not pursue and kill a wounded man.
• Avoid killing leaders, for they have the 
wealth and skills to make peace.
•  Fight wars on one front.
Rules were backed by proverbs, such as: 
• The blood of a man does not wash off 
easily.
• You live long if you plan the death of a 
pig, but not if you plan the death of a 
person. 
Under these new rules, warfare contin-
ued from ca. 1850 until 1950–60. With com-
pensation to enemy clans, migrations after 
warfare decreased significantly (Table 1).
There were still cases of runaway violence; 
however, most warfare was restricted and 
designed to restore balance of power so that 
exchange could flow. Elders used warfare 
for political strategies; young men used 
warfare as an initial step to build reputation 
by showing willingness to sacrifice for their 
clans, and the ability to do so effectively.
dEvEloPMEnts in thE 
colonial Era
The first encounters with Europeans in Enga 
occurred in the early 1930s, but owing to 
WWII, it wasn’t until the 1950s and 1960s 
that the Colonial Administration, followed 
by missions, was established throughout 
Enga. In the 1940s an epidemic of porcine 
pneumonia wiped out 20–30% of the pig 
population and dysentery affected humans. 
This does not seem to have caused many 
human deaths according to historical 
traditions (see also Meggitt 1973). Missions 
and government introduced cash crops, 
health care, education, wage labor, and 
a western justice system. The population 
increased rapidly with the establishment 
of health services in the 1960s and 1970s, 
new crops, and store bought foods such as 
tinned fish and oil. The population of Enga 
was 164,532 in 1980, 235,561 in 1990 and 
295,031 in 2000 (National Census). The 
population growth rate was estimated to be 
2.4% per annum between 1971 and 1980 
(Lea and Gray 1982), 3.6% per annum 
between 1980 and 1989, and 2.2% per 
annum between 1990 and 1999. This is very 
high compared to our estimates of 1.1% per 
annum prior to contact with Europeans.2
 During the 1950s and 1960s, the 
Australian Administration enforced a ban 
on warfare known as Pax Australiana. Initial 
resistance to the ban was squelched by 
brutal means; thereafter, leaders realized 
that if they did not squander their resources 
in war that ceremonial exchange would 
flourish. They also enjoyed “fighting in court” 
to achieve some goals, including usurping a 
few acres of land from neighbors (Gordon 
and Meggitt 1980; interview with Kambetane 
of Tetemanda Village 2004). Young men 
were offered education, new employment 
opportunities, and cash crop cultivation 
without losing the possibility to follow their 
fathers in ceremonial exchange. With 
elders and youth occupied by productive 
enterprises, warfare declined dramatically 
(Meggitt 1977). 
Around the time of independence in 1975, 
Papua New Guinea was a state in the mak-
7th–6th 4th–5th 3rd–2nd
Number of 
migrant clans 
after warfare
71 29 5*
Average 
distance of 
migration
26km 17km 15km
table 1. number and average distance of 
clan Migrations after tribal Warfare 
for Eastern and central Enga
Note  *Numerous single families or lineages 
joined relatives living elsewhere after 
warfare
generation
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ing. In Enga the pot of wealth provided by 
the national and provincial governments 
(Carrad 1982) rapidly eclipsed the great 
Tee Ceremonial Exchange Cycle. The last 
Tee Cycle was held in 1978–79. Around 
this time, men’s houses where youth had 
received crucial education from male elders 
were replaced by family houses; bachelors’ 
cults, cults for the ancestors and many other 
traditional activities ceased to be practiced. 
The goals of election politics were similar 
to those of the former Tee Cycle: to divert 
as much wealth as possible into one’s own 
area (Dinnen 2001; Gordon and Meggitt 
1985; Jameson and Wiessner 2008; Strath-
ern and Stewart 2000a). The question at 
hand was not what should be developed, but 
whose clan or tribe should reap the benefits 
of development. Once elected, representa-
tives were under great pressure to deliver to 
those who had voted for them (see Strathern 
and Stewart 2000); likewise, public servants 
were expected to divert as much wealth as 
possible to their clans. Supporters called 
this good leadership and loyalty; opponents 
called this corruption.
The resurgence of warfare
Warfare began to resurge in the years 
just before independence, largely owing 
to growing inequalities, accompanying 
jealousies, and anxiety for a future when the 
Australian Administration would withdraw 
and leave public offices open to competition. 
Moreover, Enga felt that the western justice 
system was inadequate; it required evidence 
that was extremely difficult to collect, it 
was non-political, unconcerned with future 
relations, and failed to restore relations 
between groups via mediation and material 
compensation. They saw tribal warfare as 
a way to resolve problems that could not 
be solved by other means. The benefits of 
peace experienced in the Colonial Period 
were not sufficient to deter warfare. 
By the late 1970s, warfare was once 
again prevalent in Enga and throughout the 
Highlands. As in the past, wars escalated out 
of inter-clan disputes and were fought with 
the intent of reestablishing balance of power 
after insult or injury. New issues arose that 
had no precedence for handling via custom-
ary law: deaths in car accidents, road blocks, 
destruction of government property on clan 
land, and violence related to alcohol and 
elections (Table 3). 
Police intervention in the 1980s was inef-
fective and often made the situation worse 
(Wormsley and Toke 1985). Though every-
body agreed that there was nothing to gain 
from warfare except for revenge and uphold-
ing reputation, wars raged.3
The newly formed Papua New Guinea 
government was at a loss when confronted 
with the resurgence of warfare. The brutal 
force used to curb tribal warfare in the ini-
tial years of contact with Europeans could 
not be used by a democratic government 
against its own people. In 1975 the National 
Government passed the Village Court Act as 
a recognized means of solving disputes via 
“customary law” and principles of restorative 
justice. In 1980, the Intergroup Fighting Act 
was introduced, enabling magistrates to 
impose penalties on what was judged to be 
the responsible clan. Subsequently charges 
against entire clans were ruled as unconsti-
tutional by the Supreme Court. 
The Village Court system provides an 
alternative to the formal courts and today 
handles the majority of legal disputes 
in Papua New Guinea (Goddard 2009). 
Magistrates are men knowledgeable in 
customary law and skilled in mediation who 
are chosen by the community. Even though 
serious issues such as murder, rape and 
land claims are outside the jurisdiction of 
Village Courts, these cases are regularly 
“heard” in village courts until the two parties 
reach their own informal settlement. In 
1982, Operation Mekim Save, a branch 
of the Village Courts, was designed to 
deal specifically with tribal warfare. It still 
operates in Enga today and favours judicial 
arbitration backed by punitive power over 
traditional mediation. Strong elements 
of mediation nevertheless remain and 
Operation Mekim Save magistrates are 
chosen for their connections, knowledge, 
respect and competence. Successful 
settlements were negotiated by Operation 
Mekim Save which set fixed amounts of pigs 
and cash to be given in compensation on a 
specific date. 
  Youths, Elders, and the Wages of War in Enga Province, PNG
10
Some traditional leaders claim that 
Operation Mekim Save undermined the 
fundamental principles of Enga compensa-
tion: that the amount given should be vol-
untary, that there should be compensation 
exchanges not one-time payments, and that 
the process should take place over time so 
that multiple ties can be restored. However, 
the real problems came from police action. 
Police action that backed Operation Mekim 
Save orders rarely resulted in the arrest 
of offenders and frequently involved puni-
tive raids unjustly targeting one side. In 
the police raids of the 1980s, houses were 
burned, pigs roasted, and women raped. 
This generated further tension between 
clans and mistrust of the police.
ModErn Enga WarfarE
Old man, your time has come and gone.
The 1980s and 1990s saw many efforts 
towards economic development, the promo-
tion of sports, awareness programs, and 
concerted efforts on the part of churches 
to curb tribal warfare (Young 2004; Gibbs 
2004). However, all efforts were disrupted 
by the adoption of homemade shotguns and 
high-powered rifles into tribal fighting. This 
did not happen by popular choice. Enga had 
avoided using guns in war for decades but 
once a warring party had guns, the oppo-
nents had little choice but to match them. 
The first high-powered weapons used in 
warfare were brought to Enga by two broth-
ers who deserted the Papua New Guinea 
Defense Force in the late 1980s. Around 
the same time, homemade shotguns began 
coming in from Western Highlands Province. 
Numerous clans resisted adopting guns until 
they had little choice but to join the arms race 
if they were to defend their people, property, 
and land. By the early 1990s, firearms were 
used in most Enga wars. With firearms came 
new motivations, tactics, leadership, and 
outcomes of war. Unlike in the past, conflicts 
without a history of tension could escalate 
because of multiple deaths in the first few 
days of fighting.
The frequency of tribal warfare increased 
rapidly in Enga after the introduction of fire-
arms, with the rate of warfare almost dou-
bling each five-year period from 1991–2005 
(Table 2). Why? Since Enga can solve prob-
lems either by paying compensation or by 
warfare, an increase in warfare is a matter of 
choice. There are three central reasons for 
choosing violent solutions: (1) jealousy over 
growing social inequalities, (2) new issues 
that have few precedents on customary law, 
and (3) discontented youths and the reversal 
of the age-based power hierarchy.
Competition and jealousy have always 
been forces behind conflict in Enga society 
where all men and all clans are defined as 
equal at the starting point and then chal-
lenged to excel. Engans feel that many of 
the wars of today are the result of jealousies 
aroused by different opportunities for edu-
cation, jobs, and access to cash and the 
resources of politicians. This is evidenced in 
the increase in murders, often of business-
men on the rise, as triggering incidents for 
war (Table 3). Unlike in the past, the econo-
my of Enga does not offer equal opportuni-
ties for youth. Many cannot afford the school 
fees for secondary education; they remain at 
home feeling they have little to lose in war. 
Women like men with money; young men 
without money say they have difficulties find-
ing spouses. For those who graduate from 
high school, only 10–12% have the chance 
to go on to tertiary education or to get jobs. 
Those who gain access to office and pub-
lic service channel government funds to 
their immediate supporters, creating further 
inequalities. Politics has much to do with 
creating nenge, “those who eat” money and 
jobs and nanenge, “those who do not eat” 
because their candidates do not get into 
office (see also Lakane and Gibbs 2003).
Many new issues have emerged in the past 
three decades that do not have precedents 
in “customary” law and are infrequently 
brought to formal courts. These include: 
crime committed under the influence of alco-
hol or marijuana, road blocks and vehicle 
accidents, disputes over land with royalties 
attached (mostly in Porgera), AIDS and 
witchcraft accusations, and disputes ensuing 
from the breakdown of traditional marriage 
and sexual mores. Village courts struggle 
to find solutions to these new issues with 
  Youths, Elders, and the Wages of War in Enga Province, PNG
11
reference to “custom”. Finally, with the adop-
tion of firearms,4 younger men landed in the 
driver’s seat of modern warfare as elders lost 
control of the course of battle. Wars of today 
usually start with a brawl involving clansmen 
armed with bows and arrows, bush knives 
and homemade shotguns. Before long, the 
hardcore warriors with firearms move into 
upper reaches of clan territory to fight, 
remaining beyond the control of elders for 
weeks or months. Traditional leaders who 
try to intervene are threatened by young 
men with guns and are told, “Old man, your 
day has come and gone” (Kambao Lambu, 
personal communication, Lenge, 2005). And 
so wars rage on.
Rambos
A few years after the adoption of guns, a 
new class of fighter emerged: the “hireman” 
or “Rambo”. Rambos are experts in wield-
ing high-powered weapons, and are hired 
by clans in exchange for money, pigs and 
sexual access to women. A party of fifteen to 
twenty-five supporters with homemade guns 
who seek to kill the enemy and destroy all 
resources on their land accompanies each 
Rambo. Who are the Rambos? We held 
extensive discussions with thirteen Rambos, 
twelve men and one woman, who fought in 
the wars of other clans for material com-
pensation. Two had high school educations, 
another four had completed grades 6–8, and 
the remaining seven had less than six years 
of education. All of them began their careers 
by fighting for their own clans with bows and 
arrows or shotguns to avenge injustices to 
clan members. Some were influenced by 
Hollywood “Rambo” films and felt invincible; 
others were cool, calculating fighters who 
knew the risks of the game all too well. All 
practiced war magic for both prediction and 
protection. 
Most Rambos said that they became 
caught up in the excitement of fighting in 
their initial year, reveling in the praise they 
received from kin: “Fighting is like eating 
pork, sweet for its rewards like material 
compensation, praise and attention from 
women”. From there, they sought other wars, 
whether as allied kin or local mercenaries. 
All Rambos interviewed describe turning 
into “half-halves”—half human-half animal, 
when engaged in fighting, driven only by 
the urge to kill and avenge. Once they had 
succeeded, they returned home, slept for a 
couple days, practiced cleansing rituals, and 
walked out into everyday life until they had 
table 2. number of tribal Wars by district in Enga Province since 1991
Note
*Wars between 1991–2000 in the Wabag and Wapenamanda districts were few but large and devastating.
district 1991–1995 1996–2000 2001–2005 2006–2009 total
Kandep 9 19 17 80 125
Kompiam 9 18 41 30 98
Laiagam/Lagaip 17 36 29 26 108
Porgera 1 8 36 59 104
Wabag/Ambum* 3 4 26 54 87
Wapenamanda* 6 9 31 5 51
total 45 94 180 254 573
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another chance to fight. They used most of 
their earnings to help clan members with 
school fees, hospital bills and other needs. 
Some fighters saw themselves as upholding 
justice in a state that has failed to control 
violence. A famous Rambo, Pyalup, once 
held up the police at the market place and 
took their guns saying:
You are representatives of the govern-
ment. When the war was on you did 
not show up to stop the fighting. As a 
result you see all the land devastated 
and how many lives were lost from 
Lakamanda to here. You are respon-
sible for it. For this reason I am taking 
your guns. Go in peace. 
Anonymous testimony, Par, 2005
Tribal leaders, elders, women, and many 
others despise mercenaries but are none-
theless forced to hire them for their clan’s 
survival. When high-powered weapons are 
few, the presence of one or two good mer-
cenaries determines the outcome of the war. 
Some women are attracted to Rambos, but 
most say they have sex with them to seduce 
them into staying and protecting their clans. 
Clanspeople praise such women and even 
the husbands of married women encourage 
their wives to do what is necessary in the 
interest of retaining Rambos. Businessmen 
and politicians living in cities provide money 
for arms and ammunition, or the goods 
themselves, to maintain a “big name” at 
home. Without this source of arms, fighting 
with modern weapons would be limited.
The Gangs of Enga
When traditional leaders lost control of the 
fighting, young men also lost their “fathers” 
who would eventually protect them by restor-
ing peace. In studies of western gangs it has 
been noted that young men without fathers 
form gangs of peers for security (Wrangham 
and Wilson 2004). So it was in Enga. In the 
late 1990s, Rambos formed “teams” of mer-
cenaries that crossed clan boundaries. For 
example, the Pailao team, “Pillage”, and the 
table 3. triggering incidents for Enga tribal Wars: 1885–2009
Notes
Data for 1980–85 provided by William Wormsley; *Includes insult, domestic problems, poison/sorcery
1885–1915 1981–1990 1991–2009
triggering incident         n            %        n              %         n            %
Hunting/Sharing 
Theft/Property 
Land Dispute 
Murder/Revenge 
Women/Adultery/Rape 
Tee Exchange 
Compensation 
Election Politics
Gambling/Money 
Car Accident/Road Block
Drunken Brawl/Murder
Miscellaneous* 
  6 19%
  8 25%
  7 21%
  3 11%
  4 13%
  4 11%
  0   0%
  0   0%
  0   0%
  0   0%
  0   0%
  0   0%
  0    0%
12  14%
26  31%
22  26%
  6   7%
  0   0%
  6   7%
  2   2%
  1   1%
  3   4%
  2   2%
  5   6%
    0    0%
115  20%
122  21%
150  26%
  66  12%
    0    0%
  18    3%
  31    5%
  12    2%
  26    5%
  22    4%
  10    2%
total       32        100%      85         100% 572        100%
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Nakau team, “Stinging Nettles”, of the Lai 
Valley were made up of men from four clans 
in 2005. By September 2007, the Pailao had 
men from fourteen clans or sub-clans and 
the Nakau team had men from nine. Each 
clan contributed two to four major Rambos 
to the team plus the men who accompanied 
them with shotguns. Some clans were split 
with men from one sub-clan on one team, 
and those from another sub-clan on the 
other team. The complexity of team compo-
sition generates complex conflicts that are 
difficult to settle by traditional means.
As the gangs of Enga formed, the goals 
of warfare were altered. In traditional war-
fare, everybody knew who came out on 
top, but winning and losing were not touted. 
In contrast, teams of Rambos seek sta-
tus and adopt the language of sports into 
their battles, particularly rugby. The goal of 
warfare has become “winning” by wreak-
ing absolute destruction on the other side: 
burning houses, chopping trees, destroying 
gardens, burning schools, medical aid posts, 
radio transmitters, missions and all assets 
of the modern world. Even assets precious 
to the entire district such as the Laiagam, 
Saka and Highland Lutheran International 
High Schools have gone up in flames. With 
modern materials available in these facilities, 
obtaining spoils of war has become a goal of 
warfare for the first time:
… The Pailao team, the name by 
which our team was known, shot and 
killed three people … this name was 
given to our team because we killed 
the enemy in one raid, giving them 
no chance to escape. The name 
means literally “to pillage”. Everything 
became ours from cars to snooker 
tables to cattle to houses. All the while 
we had been fighting, this area had not 
been invaded before …  Almost all of 
the land was totally devastated. This 
was done by only six of us. We took 
away everything we found and stayed 
here for about four months. This was 
a very big sensation. Many from the 
news media came and took pictures of 
the scene. The dead bodies were pho-
tographed. They gave us money for 
taking pictures. The policemen were 
there too. It was a lot of fun. From 
then on we were the winners and 
six months passed without fighting.  
Anonymous testimony, 2005
When one war was over, the Nakau 
and Pailao teams sought to colonize the 
problems of other clans in order to fight out 
their own vendettas on somebody else’s 
land, sending warfare in eastern Enga into a 
vicious cycle. In the 2002 elections, Rambos 
also began to be recruited to support candi-
dates for National Government seats. 
The demise of the Rambos: “There is 
nowhere to go Rambo, but to the grave”
After several years of warfare, most hardcore 
fighters had realized that if they stayed in the 
business of war, they would soon be dead. 
Some tried to get out of fighting but found it 
difficult because of the number of enemies 
who wanted to kill them and because they 
had become addicted to war. One man who 
had married and joined the church to give 
up warfare said, “The desire for revenge is 
engraved in my heart like the Ten Command-
ments are engraved in stone”.
One by one the leaders of the Nakau 
and Pailao teams were killed, as were other 
leading warriors. Few, if any Rambos were 
killed in battle for they were too good for 
that; most were assassinated when their 
defenses were down. Their involvement in 
national government politics put them in 
further danger. In 2007 the last of the great 
Rambos, Bokone of the Nakau team, was 
assassinated at a political rally. His followers 
chanted, “The teacher is dead, long live the 
students”. But the students did not live long 
and by 2009 the Nakau team was defeated. 
The trend of gang formation that led to a 
spiral of warfare may have seen its rise and 
fall and be but a small blip in Enga history. It 
is too early to tell.
The impact of modern war
In pre-contact wars, women and children 
living near the war zone fled to the clans 
of relatives with their pigs and possessions 
where they resided for days or weeks. All 
men remained to fight except for those who 
were too old. After approximately 1885, it 
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was unusual for entire clans to be driven off 
their land, though the defeated might lose a 
few acres (Meggitt 1977). With both clans 
remaining on their land and seeing each 
other regularly, there was more opportunity 
to restore peace. When high-powered weap-
ons come into play, people flee their homes 
at the very onset of war and live as refugees 
for months or even years. There is a saying 
in Enga: “If you destroy a nest, the birds will 
just fly around, because there is nowhere to 
settle”. Likewise, one of the intents of mod-
ern warfare is to destroy land and property 
so that the original occupants will become 
nobodies, wander like nomads, and become 
slaves on somebody else’s land. 
One of the greatest problems of modern 
warfare cited in interviews was the refugee 
problem. As long-term guests in the houses 
of kin, men, women and children suffer. Men 
must endure loss of status—as one leading 
clan leader and magistrate put it: “If some-
body rapes my wife or daughter, I must just 
turn away and pretend that I did not know”. 
Mothers find it hard to provide for their fami-
lies when living on the land of hosts; young 
women are asked to provide sexual favors 
for their hosts as payment. Children cannot 
attend school and are brutally teased for 
being homeless beggars (yandapae). Many 
refugees who have witnessed atrocities dur-
ing the war or lost loved ones complain 
of sleeplessness, a meaningless life, and 
depression. Clans near Wabag 
and other towns who host many 
refugees feel the strain on resourc-
es, general disruption of their com-
munities, and an increase in theft, 
rape and drunkenness. Finally, 
tribal leaders who are dispersed 
are not on the spot to negotiate 
settlement.
Compensation
Tribal leaders and magistrates 
from Operation Mekim Save work 
tirelessly with minimal pay to bring 
peace from the onset of a war 
until the exhaustion phase. They 
are the modern heroes of Enga. 
Though preventative orders issued 
by Operation Mekim Save are supposed to 
be backed by police support, this rarely hap-
pens except in the Porgera mining area. The 
police are under the control of the National 
Government and do not respond in time. 
Their “allowances” to go into fighting zones 
rarely arrive before the conflict is out of hand. 
Moreover, the police are no match for war-
riors in terms of weapons and fighting expe-
rience. People have great mistrust of the 
police who regularly extract bribes and thus 
villagers do not make them party to any infor-
mation that would help in stopping wars. 
When both sides have tired of war or there 
is little left to destroy, warriors step aside and 
let Operation Mekim Save together with clan 
leaders issue preventative orders, balance 
deaths with deaths, and stipulate compensa-
tion to be paid. Average compensation ordered 
for the death of a person between 1991 and 
2006 was Kina 1,239 and 26 pigs, and for 
the average war, 198 pigs and 9,542 kina, 
although the clan of the killer often tried to pay 
more to gain status (Wiessner et al. 2007). 
Enga say that there is so much compensation 
to be paid that the next generation will still be 
covering the debts of the present one.
Compensation has become a forum for 
wealthy businessmen to gain repute and 
for politicians to win votes by contributing 
large sums to settlements. Most Enga inter-
viewed criticized the wealthy and powerful 
for turning warfare into an arena for status 
competition to promote their own popularity, 
deaths War avge no. deaths 
per tribal fight
1991–1995 843 45 19
1996–2000 1399 94 15
2001–2005 1467 180 8
2006–2009 1204 254 5
total 4913 573 9
table 4. number of deaths in tribal Wars reported in 
Enga Province 1991–2009
Source: Village Court Records
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first by supplying guns and ammunition and 
then by fueling the compensation payments. 
They say that these “new big-men” are the 
very ones who permit fighting with modern 
weapons to escalate and then help cover the 
damage done by troublemakers by contribut-
ing to compensation.
Once the fighting ceases, people gradu-
ally move back to their land with apprehen-
sion. There they begin the laborious job of 
rebuilding their lives; costs are high in areas 
where timber and thatch are scarce and 
must be purchased. Time and money spent 
on rebuilding diverts families from engaging 
in more productive activities including pay-
ing school fees. Finally, warfare discourages 
development, capital investment, and busi-
ness initiatives, threatening to leave Enga 
far behind the rest of Papua New Guinea. 
Successful, educated business people move 
to the cities where they do not act as role 
models for young people.
The response of clan leaders
Since Rambos took over the driver’s seat of 
the “war bus”, clan leaders are by no means 
asleep in the back seat. They are acutely 
aware of the need to realign their goals 
with those of youths and have begun work 
on a number of fronts. First, elders make 
efforts to get parents to pay school fees and 
place more emphasis on education. Church 
leaders work tirelessly to combat tribal war-
fare. On the front lines, church leaders 
take considerable risks to intervene and 
to stop the conflict (Young 2004). In some 
areas, “prayer warriors” meet several times 
a week to combat conflict with prayer. Indig-
enous Christian movements opposing war 
are exciting, drawing in people with exuber-
ant singing and trance (Gibbs 2004). Youth 
groups tied to churches divert attention from 
fighting to sports and give young men a 
sense of brotherhood similar to that which 
they experience in war. Women’s groups 
oppose war but have not been as successful 
in intervening as they have in other parts of 
Papua New Guinea. Preachers try to alter 
values from payback to forgiveness; though 
this shift is on people’s lips, in practice it will 
be a long time coming.
 Since the introduction of the mobile 
phone in 2007, tribal leaders have devel-
oped rapid response units to inform each 
other of conflicts, rush to the trouble spots, 
and nip trouble in the bud. Some tribes 
have formed legally registered community 
governments who plan community projects 
and lay down community rules. In one such 
community government, the Yakani Tambu-
kini, rules include no gambling in the market 
place, no drinking and marijuana smoking, 
and no “animal houses” during election 
(houses where sex is exchanged for votes). 
When elders go around admonishing those 
who break the rules, many youths listen, for 
young people also fear the recent chaos.5 
In some clans elder men spend time with 
young men on Saturday afternoons, often 
table 5. number of deaths Before tribal War Was Ended: 1991–2009
1991–1995 1996–2000 2001–2005 2001–2005
no. deaths by 
War End
     n             %     n             %     n            %      n            %
1–5
6–10
11–50
      51–300 
   10    22%
   18    40%
   13    29%
     4      9%
  42    45%
  24          26%
  20          21%
    8            9%
    116      64%
     27      15%
     34      19%
       3        2%
  
   192   75%
     36   14%
     25   10%
       1     1%
total Wars 45        100%   94         100% 180        100% 254      100%
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with political motives but nonetheless align-
ing the goals of the two generations as was 
done traditionally in men’s houses and dur-
ing bachelors’ cults.
The efforts of tribal leaders fall on fertile 
soil. The population of Enga is weary of futile 
modern war and the destruction it brings. 
Many in the upcoming generation have spent 
miserable years as refugees and want the 
benefits of the modern world, not war. In 2006 
we interviewed fifty children about their views 
on warfare. Children expressed their desire 
for revenge against those who treated them 
badly as war refugees. Nonetheless, destruc-
tion of their homes, loss of relatives, and 
experiences as refugees made most children 
reject war. Older boys stated that they would 
only fight to defend their own clans. Children 
admire Rambos and like to talk about their 
exploits but recognize that the lives of Ram-
bos are short and lead nowhere.
A return to moderation?
Court records and interviews from 1991 
to 2009 present some interesting trends. 
The number of wars has steadily increased 
owing to ever-new conflicts caused by grow-
ing social inequalities and jealousies, road 
blocks, beer, marijuana, election politics and 
breakdown in traditional marriages, amongst 
other things. Although only 5% of recent 
fights have been caused by election politics, 
tensions generated during elections contrib-
ute significantly to the increase in fighting. 
However, as the number of wars had been 
increasing, the average number of deaths 
per war has decreased steadily from nine-
teen in 1991–95 just after the adoption of 
guns in warfare to five in 2006–09 (Table 4). 
The percentage of wars settled early after 
1–5 deaths, has risen from a mere 22% in 
1991–95 to 75% in 2006–09 (Table 5). The 
number of wars with 11–300 deaths has 
declined significantly during the same peri-
od. This trend can be attributed to the efforts 
by elders and village court magistrates, the 
unwillingness of 90% of the population to 
support war, and the demise of the Nakau 
and Pailao teams. Nobody interviewed felt 
that the government had played a significant 
table 6. outcome of inter-clan conflicts Brought to operation Mekim save in Enga Province 2006–2009
resorted to War solved by Mediation totals
type of incident      n             %        n              %         n            %
Land Dispute 
Murder/Revenge 
Theft/Property 
Gambling/Money 
Drunken Brawl/Murder/Beer
Car Accident/Roadblock 
Rape 
Women/Adultery
Domestic Problems 
Poison/Sorcery
Politics
Marijuana
Compensation 
48 50%
45 71%
59 46%
  3 23%
16 26%
18 38%
11          55%
32 43%
  3 33%
  1   6%
17 85%
  0   0%
  1        100%
48 50%
18 29%
70 54%
10 77%
46 74%
29 62%
  9 45%
42 57%
  6 67%
17 94%
  3 15%
  3        100%
  0   0%
  96   100%
  63   100%
129   100%
  13   100%
  62   100%
  47   100%
  20   100%
  74   100%
   9   100%
  18   100%
  20   100%
   3   100%
   1   100%
Land disputes, murder and rape are outside the jurisdiction of Operation Mekim Save and can only be 
heard until disputants reach their own decision.
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role in reducing violence; my observations 
support these views.
Operation Mekim Save records and tes-
timonies by magistrates also suggest that 
some inter-clan conflicts are increasingly 
being taken for mediation without an initial 
violent response: murders during drunken 
brawls, fights over gambling and money, 
domestic problems, car accidents and poi-
son/sorcery (Table 6). Half or more of the inci-
dents involving disputes over land, theft and 
property, and women are solved by media-
tion; however, murder, revenge and election 
politics continue to draw violent responses. 
As pressure on land increases, village courts 
hear many land cases but these are largely 
between neighbors in one clan. 
Trends toward a reduction in violence are 
first occurring in central areas where there 
is more development and thus people have 
more to lose. Warfare has virtually ceased 
in Wapenamanda, the easternmost district 
of Enga and the gateway to Enga owing to 
business development, active church groups 
and the rejection of mercenaries (Table 7). 
In the Wabag district where the seat of Pro-
vincial Government is located, the number 
of wars did not decrease in 2006–09 owing 
to tensions generated by complex elec-
tion politics and activities of the Pailao and 
Nakau teams, but the average number of 
deaths per war decreased from twenty-six in 
2001–03 to three in 2006–09 (Table 7), indi-
cating that people are settling wars earlier. In 
the Lagaip District west of Wabag, an area 
known to have some of the most vicious war-
fare in the Province, warfare has leveled off 
and the number of deaths decreased. This 
has happened despite ever-new tensions 
and jealousies generated by wealth from the 
Porgera mine filtering down the valley. Mag-
istrates and elders of these districts feel very 
encouraged by both the statistics and real 
changes in the attitudes of people. 
Change in the outlying districts is 
slower. The Kompiam district experienced 
severe warfare from 2006–09 for no easily 
discernable reason except for frustrations 
with lack of development and roads too poor 
to market crops and effectively participate in 
the cash economy. Nevertheless, Kompiam 
magistrates felt that since 2008 their area 
was taking a turn towards peace. Kandep 
magistrates attributed the great increase 
in tribal fighting to the 2009 Kandep bi-
elections that were fraught with high-
powered weapons, threat and violence, the 
withdrawal of the Operation Mekim Save 
vehicle by the MP for political reasons, and 
inequalities from differential participation in 
the modern economy. Finally, in the Porgera 
area fighting increased to the point where 
a state of emergency was declared and 
a massive police operation carried out in 
2009 quelling tribal warfare, amongst other 
things. However, magistrates do not feel 
that the underlying disputes over land with 
mine royalties have been solved. They 
fear that warfare will resume unless the 
Government works with Operation Mekim 
table 7. average number of tribal Wars and deaths Per War: 2001–2009
2001–2003     2004–2006     2007–2009
Total    Avge
     Wars  Deaths
   Total     Avge
   Wars   Deaths
   Total    Avge
  Wars   Deaths
Wapenamanda
Wabag
Lagaip/Laiagam
Kandep
Kompiam
      Porgera 
    17        6
    21      26
    18      10
    13           13
    31            6
    21        3 
    14       2
    17       7
    19       6
    27           6
    17           5
    41       3 
    5      2
   42     3
   18      4
   57           5
   23           7
   33           4 
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Save magistrates to renegotiate land claims 
so that Barrick Gold can accommodate the 
demands of the many second third generation 
landowners born into complex polygynous 
“marriages” of original landowners. 
While preliminary data indicate that peo-
ple are beginning to be successful in contain-
ing warfare, they also indicate high levels of 
violent individual crime (Tables 3 and 6). The 
decline in traditional activities, involvement 
in the cash economy, and modern politics 
has eroded clan loyalties. Youths no longer 
have to carefully consider the impact of their 
actions on their corporate groups and act on 
their own whims. Consequently records from 
2008–09 indicate a rise in robbery, rape and 
unprecedented murder of innocent women 
and children as individuals act on their own 
whims and interests, often under the influence 
of drugs and alcohol. In a few isolated cases, 
clan members have responded by executing 
the offender, but in most cases, criminals are 
still harbored by their kin. Random violence 
may be as destructive to development as 
rampant warfare. Finally, while sorcery was 
only practiced by groups in the periphery of 
Enga in the past, sorcery accusations and 
witch killing have moved into the Kandep 
region for the first time (Table 6), and village 
court magistrates are at a loss for dealing 
with them. This corresponds to the resur-
gence in witch killing in  Papua New Guinea 
in recent years (Amnesty International 2006; 
Gibbs 2010; Zoo ca et al.), an issue reported 
frequently in The National and Post Courier 
newspapers in recent years.
Though it may be too early to say, it 
appears that the trend seen in the 19th cen-
tury may have begun to repeat itself: runway 
violence coinciding with rapid demographic 
growth, followed by social engineering on 
the part of elders to restore stability. Recent 
reasons for the decline in warfare appear to 
be: (1) the successful efforts of tribal leaders 
to contain violence, (2) initiatives by church 
leaders to instill new norms and values, (3) 
a population weary of war and refugee life, 
(4) an attempt by elders to realign the politi-
cal goals of youths and to set a prescribed 
path for the future through education, (5) 
the deaths of prominent Rambos, (6) a 
new generation of youths who have felt the 
costs of warfare and don’t want to go there, 
and (7) desire to spend household money 
on expenses other than war compensation 
payments, particularly on school fees. In the 
past, parallel developments were achieved 
through bachelors’ cults, the Great Ceremo-
nial Wars, the extension of compensation to 
the enemy to make peace, and laying down 
a prescribed course of success through 
ceremonial exchange. No doubt at that time 
people were also tired of war. Both periods 
saw a shift in the age-related power struc-
ture, resulting chaos and the reestablish-
ment of order as elders took control.
What next? 
Elders are well aware that if they are in 
the driver’s seat of the “war bus” that 
today they must drive on roads build by 
the government, not on the paths of Enga 
trodden by their own feet in clay soil. In 
discussions about the decline in warfare 
since 2006, nobody interviewed felt that the 
Government had played a significant role 
in containing warfare. Papua New Guinea 
might be termed a “detached state” from 
the Enga perspective and ranks 154 out 
of 180 on the Transparency International 
Perceived Corruption Index. Basic govern-
ment services such as health, education, 
police and road maintenance have declined 
significantly in Enga since independence; 
the government does not have a monopoly 
on the use of force. Police under the control 
of the National Government are slow to 
respond to trouble in Enga, if they respond 
at all. The province is caught in a downward 
spiral as politicians and public servants 
misappropriate funds to “buy” votes rather 
than providing services. When services are 
not delivered for lack of funds, discontented 
voters demand ever more money for their 
votes to make sure that the election yields 
something for them.
The fact that warfare is beginning to be 
taken in hand by grassroots efforts with little 
input from the government may be positive 
Since warfare has significantly derailed the 
power and projects of the state in the last two 
decades, it is possible that stability coming 
from within tribes will pave the way for better 
government services.
  Youths, Elders, and the Wages of War in Enga Province, PNG
19
Though encouraged by trends towards 
peace, clan leaders, women and Operation 
Mekim Save magistrates are concerned for 
a number of reasons. Leaders are manag-
ing to align goals of elders and youths to set 
new directions; however, if these directions 
do not yield real opportunities for youths in a 
population growing at a mighty rate of 2–3% 
per annum, stability will not endure. Equal 
opportunity is of utmost importance to Enga, 
has deep historical roots and forms the basis 
for cooperation. Much depends on govern-
ment initiatives to develop economic oppor-
tunities, infrastructure, and to curb population 
growth. However, this can only happen with 
a decrease in the tribal warfare that destroys 
infrastructure and makes government work-
ers fearful of travel into clan territories. Mod-
els and values coming from the top at the 
moment are ones of “taking one’s share of 
the government cake”, not sharing the cake 
to fuel development. Only if the government 
is able to take advantage of current trends 
towards peace and develop roads that lead 
to a better future, will elders and the youths 
have a chance bring about change as they 
did once before, some 160 years ago.
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EndnotEs
1.  Meggitt’s (1977) thesis was that the Enga 
fought over land, though he himself named 
his book Blood is their Argument not Land 
is their Argument. In his last chapter he 
admits that the Enga had no shortage 
of land but fought over “perceived” land 
shortage. The high frequency of conflict 
over land seems in part to have been 
generated by the Land Titles Commission 
in the Colonial Period. Additionally, many 
elders interviewed said that they told 
the administration and other foreigners 
that they fought over land because this 
is the only reason foreigners, who did 
not understand the complexity of Enga 
politics, accepted as a rational reason to 
fight, This is reflected in the fact that land 
disputes made up 73% of the reasons 
given warfare in the colonial era (1950–
70), 38% of the wars recorded in provincial 
files just before and after independence in 
1975, and 26% of the triggering incidents 
for disputes between 1980 and 2006 
(Allen and Giddings 1982; Gordon and 
Kipilan 1982; Meggitt 1977; Paney 1973; 
Wiessner 2006). 
2. Our study of 1,000 marriages in the 
Wabag area in 2005–06 (Wiessner, in 
preparation) indicates that the growth 
rate for 2000-2009 might further decline 
because the breakdown of traditional 
marriages, widespread promiscuity, and 
the spread of STDs.
3. From the Colonial era on, it was unusual 
that land was gained during warfare.
4. Factory made weapons reported to us by 
tribal fighters include M-16, SLR, AK47, 
SKS, Point 22, 3.88, and American-
made five-round pump action shotguns. 
Grenades are not widely used because 
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fighters try to target certain persons, not 
to kill large numbers. Each weapon has 
its own history, and most appear to have 
been originally stolen from the Defense 
Force or police or made their way to 
Enga through local networks (see also 
Alpers 2005). Others are obtained from 
politicians who own security firms and 
have weapons licenses. In one clan of 
the Lagaip, a machinist has been able 
to construct a home made M-16; the 
gun is named “Yaka Maitane” after the 
legendary tribal founder of the Sakate and 
Yambanima tribes.
5. With my assistance, the Tambukinis 
launched a community project to “go to 
war” against HIV/AIDS by encouraging all 
members to be tested and retested when 
changing partners.
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